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Remodelling the System of Legal Protection in Hungary 
 
Abstract. The study presents how the system of legal protection since the turn of the 1980s 
and 1990s, as a consequence of the changed international, political and economic circumstances, 
has been transformed in Hungary according to the requirements of a modern constitutional 
state. Giving information on the relevant historical-legal antecedents in Hungary, the then 
arising practical exigencies and different recently applied models in Western democracies, 
taken as starting points during the elaboration of the reform, the pros and cons of the latters, 
the study analyses the solutions introduced at the time of the change of the political-economic 
regime, their later developments, as well as the present-day system of legal protection in 
Hungary, making mentions of problems, too, which arise in some respects even nowadays. 
Taking all these into account, a comprehensive information is given in the study on the 
establishment of the Parliamentary Commissioners for Civic Rights and of the Constitutional 
Court in Hungary, on the prosecutor’s (procurator’s) offices and courts of justice, focusing 
on the relating constitutional principles, their organisation, competences, guarantees of 
independence and staff problems alike.  
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Introduction 
 
Since the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, the transformation of the system of legal 
protection according to the requirements of the constitutional state has featured 
as a distinguished goal of the reform of the state establishment, primarily 
following the declaration made at the Party Conference of the Hungarian Socialist 
Labour Party (MSZMP) on the necessity of the review of the Constitution in 
search for an answer to the conditions of the increasingly critical economic 
situation that generated social discontent, to the restricted democratic rights 
and freedoms and to the Soviet “perestroika” more favourable to Hungarian 
state sovereignty. Thereby, not only research that kept the modernisation of 
state establishment in view for several years gathered impetus, but the preparation 
of drafting the new Constitution commenced in an institutional framework, as 
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well, particularly as pursuant to the MT Resolution 2022/1988 (HT. 7) passed 
in August by the Council of Ministers.1 That work encompassed all areas of 
constitutional regulation, in which the reform of the framework and functioning 
of legal protection was inevitably highlighted. In fact, simultaneously with 
drafting the Constitution, the establishment of a new organ of legal protection, 
i.e. of the Constitutional Court was anticipated under the Amendment of the 
Constitution of 1989 adopted on 10th January, 1989 on the grounds of the 
position taken by the Party Conference. Furthermore, the problem of the overall 
framework of legal protection was also dealt with under government documents 
framed during the preparation of the Constitution that drew on its interim 
results. Thus the option of instituting the spokesman for civic rights (ombuds-
man) in the framework of legal protection was first proposed in an official form 
in the document issued by the Ministry of Justice on 30th November, 1988 titled 
“Conception of the Regulation of the New Constitution of the Hungarian 
People’s Republic”. The draft titled “The Principles of the Regulation of the 
Constitution of Hungary” was prepared by the Ministry of Justice on 30th 
January, 1989 and the respective Resolution was adopted by Parliament on 9th 
March, furthermore, instead of the Draft Act on the Constitution, which was 
not framed for political reasons, the scope of the “qualified” transition was 
also delineated by the Draft Act amending the Constitution elaborated by the 
Ministry of Justice on 29th May, 1989 and tabled by the Government on the 
motion of the Political Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Labour Party 
(MSZMP) amongst opposition endeavours that gained ground.  
 The prerequisites of the actual political-economic transformation directed 
up to that time by the “state party” were created on 10th June, 1989, when an 
agreement concerning the commencement of substantial political negotiations 
was concluded by the MSZMP, various social organisations and movements 
and the Opposition Round–Table. In this process, at the National Round–Table 
Negotiations a trilateral consensus was reached concerning the fundamental 
issues put on the agenda of the discussions on the systems of political, 
economic and social institutions. According to the agreement concluded on 21st 
June, the consensus concerned also areas of the framework of legal protection, 
  
 1 See, especially, the introductory essay of Géza Kilényi for Egy alkotmány-előkészí-
tés dokumentumai (The Documents of Drafting the Constitution). Kísérlet Magyarország új 
Alkotmányának megalkotására, 1988–1990 (Efforts at Drafting the New Constitution of 
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1993.  
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for instance, the topical formulae of the Amendment of the Constitution and 
issues related to the Constitutional Court.  
 Following from the above, the adoption of the new Constitution was 
temporarily removed from the agenda and the Government also withdrew the 
bills with the content covered in the course of the trilateral negotiations. The 
Parliament in its Session of 27th June did not put the discussion of the Draft Act 
amending the Constitution of 29th May or of the Draft Act on the Constitutional 
Court on its agenda. With regard to the documents on the Amendment of the 
Constitution and on the Constitutional Court mentioned above, the common 
standpoint was formulated primarily at an expert level in work committees 
in fierce discussions often motivated by political concerns and interests.2 
Standpoints which according to the closing Agreement of 18th September 
of the National Round–Table Negotiations held between 13th June and 18th 
September, 1989, were realized in draft bills as well. Under the political agree-
ment, the Government recognised these as its own proposals and subsequently to 
not so much content-based as formal modifications, submitted to Parliament.3 
After a short debate, the supreme Hungarian representative body passed them 
with minor amendments in October, 1989. 
 The “constitutional revolution” had not been completed as pursuant to 
the comprehensive Amendment of the Constitution under Act XXXI of 1989. 
First of all, the adoption of Acts to implement the Amendment of the Constitution 
was still necessary, which was accomplished in 1989 and within 3–4 years 
following 1990 as a result of the work of democratically elected parliaments. 
Subsequently, however, further reformulation, readjustment and development 
of several constitutional institutions were even at that time imperative by reason 
of the inevitable improvisation, inaccuracy and non-availability of practical 
experience implicated in the urgency of the Amendment of the Constitution 
and of law-making as well as the rapidly changing social–political conditions. 
Despite relevant attempts and owing to the non-agreement between parliamentary 
parties, Hungary has failed to frame a new Constitution, whereas our constitu-
tional framework has been completely reorganised and reinforced. According 
to the requirements of a constitutional state based on the rule of law, the 
framework of legal protection has also been transformed. In the course of the 
  
 2 See, Halmai, G.: Az 1949-es alkotmány jogállamosítása (The Reformulation of the 
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Transformation. Round–Table Negotiations in 1989). Vol. 7. Alkotmányos forradalom (Cons-
titutional Revolution). Essays. Új Mandátum Publisher, Budapest, 2000. 180. and following. 
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political transformation, two new bodies of legal protection have been established, 
too, namely, the institution of the ombudsman and the Constitutional Court. 
Owing to the changes, the framework of legal protection today bears comparison 
in all its dimensions even at an international level. This holds true despite the 
fact that the reasonableness of several solutions, either sustained throughout 
the political transformation or newly adopted, has been challenged up to now. 
In the followings, we shall explore what the above exactly imply with respect 
to the institutions of the ombudsman, the prosecution, the judiciary and the 
Constitutional Court, which belong to the constitutional framework of legal 
protection.  
 
 
The Establishment of the Institution of the Ombudsman (Parliamentary 
Commissioner) in Hungary 
 
The Institution of the Parliamentary Commissioner originates in Scandinavia 
and looks back on a past of two centuries. According to the Swedish model, 
it gained ground in other Scandinavian countries primarily following the 2nd 
World War and in several Western European countries (e.g., in England, France, 
Austria, Spain) following the 1960s and 1970s. Moreover, we can assert that 
the introduction of the institution of the Parliamentary Commissioner was 
put on the agenda on other continents and has been spreading all over the 
world. 
 Basically, two factors account for the apparent prevalence of the institution 
of the Parliamentary Commissioner. Primarily, it is considered to be an 
appropriate form of the extension of parliamentary control over the executive 
power, but its establishment has also created an additional guarantee for the 
protection of citizens’ rights.   
 The traditional forms of function of the parliament are not appropriate for the 
control of the legality of particular procedures of applying the law by authorities. 
Albeit the representatives place great emphasis on the settlement of the 
complaints of their constituents, even if the settlement of individual and group 
complaints distracts them from performing their “express” representative duties. 
Therefore, as a result of the delegation of power to promote to solve individual 
and group grievances to the Parliamentary Commissioner, not only the 
supervisory power of Parliament will be construed as more comprehensive, 
but representatives will also be exempted from the task of attending to the 
complaints of their constituents.  
 The establishment of the institution of the Parliamentary Commissioner is 
further justified by the consequent extension of guarantees for increased 
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protection of the rights and lawful interests of citizens, even if independent 
judicial review of the legality of administrative decisions is available in every 
case. Nevertheless, the instrument of judicial remedy is perforce incomplete. 
Generally, courts cannot secure remedy if the officials of the respective 
authority resort to offensive abuse, fail to make a decision within the prescribed 
or reasonable period, do not institute proceedings in an arbitrary manner within 
their discretionary powers, perchance take arbitrary measures or decisions. In 
case of such abuses, if the procedure is otherwise lawful, courts do barely have 
the power to proceed, since the authority resorts to arbitrary measures only 
within the scope of law. For instance, the law allows that the authority in a 
given group of cases made either an affirmative or a negative decision within 
its discretionary powers, and on these grounds it may grant the request of 
one party and dismiss that of the other without a recognisable reason. Similar 
inconsistencies may appear in the system of remedies not only in adminis-
trative, but also in judicial, prosecuting or other procedures by authorities or 
quasi authorities. In such cases, with regard to judicial independence, except 
for court proceedings, intervention by the Parliamentary Commissioner (in 
certain cases by commissioners attached to other organs, such as, e.g., the Head 
of State or bodies of local self-government), being independent of the organs 
of applying the law is deemed to be a supplement and an effective instrument 
of the increased protection of civil rights and lawful interests. 
 At the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, the establishment of the institution of the 
Parliamentary Commissioner was necessitated by similar reasons in Hungary, as 
well. The document issued on 30th November, 1988 by the Ministry of Justice 
with the title “Conception of the Regulation of the New Constitution of the 
Hungarian People’s Republic”, based on foreign examples and Hungarian research, 
referred to the necessity of the establishment of the institution (“spokesman for 
civic rights”), in case the competence of the prosecution (independent of the 
executive power, i.e. the administration) to exercise full legality supervision 
would be substantially transformed (narrowed) or abolished. Consequently, a 
largely similar scope of duties could be delegated to the power of the ombuds-
man. This conception was reaffirmed under the Resolution of Parliament 
adopted on 9th March 1989 on the Principles of the Regulation of the Consti-
tution of Hungary.  
 The Draft Act of 29th May, 1989 amending the Constitution did not set 
forth the establishment of the institution of the Parliamentary Commissioner. 
However, the establishment of the institution was highlighted again at the 
National Round–Table Negotiations that commenced in June, whereas at that 
time it was not directly attached to the transformation of the scope of power of 
the prosecution. Finally, according to the agreement, the Constitution should 
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stipulate an authorisation for the establishment of the institution of a general 
ombudsman and of special parliamentary commissioners at a later date. Such 
independent institutions could be, e.g., the Parliamentary Commissioners for 
Data Protection, Environmental Protection and for Protection of Minorities, 
who would proceed in matters concerning national minorities.4 
 According to the Round–Table Agreement, the comprehensive Amendment 
of the Constitution of 1989 provided for the establishment of the institution 
of the “Parliamentary Commissioner for Civic Rights”. Accordingly, the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for Civic Rights shall be responsible for the 
investigation or initiating the investigation of cases involving irregularities 
related to constitutional rights he has become aware of and initiating general 
or specific measures for their redress. Proceedings by the ombudsman may be 
initiated by any citizen in the cases specified by law. The Parliamentary 
Commissioner shall be elected by Parliament based on the proposal of the 
President of the Republic. The Parliament may also elect special commissioners 
for the protection of specific constitutional rights. The Parliamentary Commis-
sioners shall submit an annual report on their activities to Parliament. The 
detailed rules concerning Parliamentary Commissioners shall be set forth 
under an Act of constitutional force. Later, Act XL of 1990 amended the 
constitutional provisions by specifying the institution of the Parliamentary 
Commissioner for the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities as responsible 
for investigating or initiating the investigation of cases involving irregularities 
related to the rights of national or ethnic minorities he has become aware of 
and initiating general or specific measures for their redress. According to 
this amendment, in a remarkable way, the competence of the Parliamentary 
Commissioner would have been exercised by a body consisting of one repre-
sentative of each national and ethnic minority, who were to be proposed on 
the motions of national and ethnic minority organisations by the President of 
the Republic and elected by Parliament. This solution was primarily promoted 
so that national and ethnic minority rights could be enforced, since the 
autonomous representation of national and ethnic minorities had not been 
granted in Parliament and according to the reasoning of the draft amendment, 
the authority of the Parliamentary Commissioner to protect minorities may 
even be considerably broader and more efficient than those of the MPs. Later, 
however, as pursuant to Act LXXIII of 1994 amending the Constitution, the 
  
 4 See: Bozóki, A.–Elbert, M. et al. (eds.): A rendszerváltás forgatókönyve. Kerek-
asztal-tárgyalások 1989-ben (The Dramaturgy of the Political Transformation. Round–
Table Negotiations in 1989). Vol. 6. Documents. Ed., introduction and notes by Kalmár, 
M.–Révész, B. Új Mandátum Publisher, Budapest, 2000.  618.  
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amendment above providing for the establishment of the quasi “representative” 
body designated to protect national and ethnic minority rights was repealed. 
Subsequently, the person of Commissioner to protect minorities too, shall be 
elected with a qualified majority vote by Parliament on the proposal of the 
President of the Republic as pursuant to the Amendment of 1990. Besides, since 
the Act with constitutional force as a special type of Acts ceased to exist in 
1990, the detailed rules concerning Parliamentary Commissioners was to be 
specified under a qualified majority Act of Parliament. Accordingly, this was 
accomplished on the adoption of Act LIX of 1993 on the Parliamentary 
Commissioner for Civic Rights, which was supplemented by Act LXXVII of 
1993 on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities, furthermore, by Act 
LXIII of 1992 on Personal Data Protection and Publicity of Data of Public 
Interest with respect to the still acting Commissioner for the Rights of National 
and Ethnic Minorities as well as Commissioner for Data Protection; the Com-
missioner for Data Protection having even special powers exceptionally as 
an authority. Following their election in 1995 for a term of 6 years, the 
Parliamentary Commissioners, who may be once re-elected, started their work. 
The considerations of the supporters of the introduction of the institution have 
been justified by the fact that the independent parliamentary commissioners 
subjected exclusively to the Constitution and other law have proceeded in 
their offices to common content. The favourable judgement of their operation 
manifests itself in the recurrent claim for the establishment of further offices of 
special commissioners, too, in favour of more efficient protection of consti-
tutional rights drifting into the focus of general attention.  
 According to the Constitution and Act LIX of 1993, the Parliamentary 
Commissioner for Civic Rights shall be competent to exercise its supervisory 
or controlling power in all cases, if, in consequence of the proceedings of any 
authority or an organ performing public service or its decision made (measure 
taken) and/or of the omission of measures a person’s constitutional (fundamental 
or “human”) rights have been injured or if its direct threat obtains, provided that 
the person concerned has exhausted the available administrative legal remedies 
(except for the judicial review of an administrative decision as pursuant to a 
later amendment) or provided that no legal remedy has been secured. With 
regard to determining the scope of competence of the Commissioner, the 
following aspects are, however remarkable: 
 – Concerning its application, Article 29 of the original text of the Act 
specified the scope of organs that qualify as authority and are subject to the 
authority of the Commissioner. Later, however, the Constitutional Court stated 
in its Decision of 7/2001 (III. 14.) that in some aspects the definition was vague, 
since it was not unambiguous, which organs the supervisory power of the 
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Commissioner exactly encompassed. This contradicts the principle of legal 
security that grounds a state based on the rule of law. In view of that, several 
points of the definition were annulled by reason of unconstitutionality, which 
called for a more accurate regulation of Article 29 under Act XC of 2001, 
according to which an authority, that the competence of the Commissioner 
pertains to, is an organ performing public administration, an organ exercising 
its competence of public administrative character, the armed forces, the policing 
organs, the national security service, the investigating authority including the 
public prosecutor’s office performing prosecution investigation, local self-
governments and national or ethnic minority self-governments, a public body 
operating on the basis of obligatory membership, a notary public, the county 
court bailiff and the independent court bailiff. Nevertheless, in respect to the 
application of the Act, the Parliament, the President of the Republic, the 
Constitutional Court, the State Audit Office, the court, the Office of the Public 
Prosecutor, except for the prosecuting authority that accomplishes prosecution 
investigation, shall not qualify as authority. 
 – The power of supervision of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Civic 
Rights encompasses only the activities or omissions of authorities and organs 
performing public service concerning the exercise of constitutional rights. It 
shall not encompass the entire activity of the supervised organs, such as the 
case in respect of, e.g., public administration in some countries. Its supervision 
necessarily pertains, first of all, to the operation of public administration, so far 
as it interacts with a great number of citizens on a daily basis. Nevertheless, 
we may assert that its basic agency is the protection of fundamental rights, 
rather than the external supervision of the executive power or of public 
administration. 
 – The Commissioner is responsible for the elimination or the prevention 
of the injury of fundamental constitutional rights. As a consequence, it super-
vises mainly the lawfulness of the operation of different organs. In its scope 
of constitutional authority, however, it is entitled to intervene in any case of 
irregularities concerning the enforcement of constitutional rights he has 
cognisance of even if it does not directly infringe any legal rule. Consequently, 
it may examine, and according to the established practice it has done so, whether 
the authority within its discretionary powers had proceeded in a consistent 
manner and in good faith. In its procedure, the authority may not pursue any 
objective other than it has powers and competence for; it may proceed on an 
objective and impartial basis with respect to the relevant circumstances in the 
case concerned. It shall make a decision adequate for the peculiarities of the 
case within a reasonable period even if this period is shorter than the period 
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specified by law. Human dignity shall at all times be respected in the course of 
the proceedings by the authority.5   
 The institution of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Civic Rights is related 
to Parliament. Nevertheless, it is not expressly an organ of Parliament exercising 
supervision or control, at least not in the sense as it is in several countries 
(e.g., England and France), where, according to the rule, the investigation of 
the complaints of citizens may be initiated by their representative or senator 
in Parliament. In Hungary, those concerned may directly initiate proceedings 
by the Commissioner in cases subject to its scope of supervision, who shall 
examine the filed petition and proceed to investigate the case on a mandatory 
basis unless the irregularity mentioned in the petition, according to the judge-
ment of the ombudsman, is of small importance. Otherwise, the Parliamentary 
Commissioner is entitled to proceed in order to reveal and terminate any 
irregularity concerning constitutional rights ex officio on any or without notifi-
cation, too. 
 As in other countries, the Parliamentary Commissioner does not have, as a 
rule, powers to redress the revealed irregularity. According to the nature of the 
irregularity, he may, for instance, resort to the following “soft” measures that 
can by no means be considered insignificant by reason of the great publicity his 
activity entails: initiate that the organ incurring the irregularity terminated it, or 
recommend redress of the irregularity to the supervisory authority. The 
Parliamentary Commissioner may initiate that the competent public prosecutor 
lodged a prosecutor’s protest. If in the course of proceedings, the Commissioner 
forms a grounded suspicion of perpetration of a disciplinary or petty offence, 
he may, whereas if he forms that of a criminal offence, he shall initiate the 
corresponding process. He may initiate that the Constitutional Court instituted 
proceedings. So that the irregularity shall be avoided in the future, the Com-
missioner may recommend that the organ authorised to make law or norms 
amends, repeals or frames a legal rule or any normative legal instrument. 
Eventually, the Commissioner shall notify the Parliament of the revealed 
irregularity or request its investigation in his annual report, or, if the irregularity 
is extraordinarily massive, in the interim period. 
 
  
 5 See, e.g., Report of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Civic Rights and its General 
Deputy on their activity in the period of 1st January–31st December, 1998 submitted to 
Parliament. In: Hungarian Official Gazette, II./79/1999. 18. 
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The Organisation and Functions of the Prosecution’s (Procurator’s) 
Offices 
 
Following the bourgeois transformation, the system of prosecution on the 
European continent was in general established as subordinated to the executive 
power (Government, Minister of Justice), and, according to the French model, 
it was strictly centralised and performed duties almost exclusively related 
to criminal procedures (accusation, public prosecution at court) so that the 
uniformity of prosecution could be ensured. Such prosecution was established 
in Hungary following 1871, as well. Lately, in view of the requirement of 
impartial criminal investigation, issues such as guaranteeing the independence of 
prosecution, loosening its attachment to the executive and constraining the 
directive power of the superior authority in the centralised system have all been 
stressed. Nevertheless, the system of prosecution is still generally a levelled, 
hierarchical structure attached to the executive power. Apart from duties related 
to the prosecution, it secondarily or exceptionally attends to civil procedural or 
administrative duties. The scope of duties of the prosecution does not include, 
in principle, the supervision of the legality of public administration. In several 
countries, similar duties are performed by the institution of the Parliamentary 
Commissioner, which is independent of the executive power. 
 Following 1917, in Russia or the Soviet Union the system of prosecution 
established, with respect to its organisation and functions, was different from 
the solutions adopted in Western Europe. After 1936, the strictly centralised 
prosecution was separated from public administration and it was organised 
not as a member state, but as a federal organisation dependent exclusively on the 
supreme federal organ of representation. This principally promoted centralisation, 
which was instrumental to the uniform enforcement of federal law on the whole 
territory of the federation. This organisational construction was also sub-
stantiated by the fact that the prosecution was constituted as not only responsible 
for criminal and partly civil procedures, but also for the so-called general 
supervision of legality, so, accordingly, it supervised both the lawful operation 
of state, social and economic organs and the legality of the activities of citizens. 
Nevertheless, the prosecution controlled principally the lawful functioning 
of public administration. Therefore, the consequential assurance of the effective-
ness of Acts and other law required that this duty was performed not by an 
organ related to, but by one that was independent of public administration. 
This solution, which guaranteed the “external” supervision of administration, 
could, in principle, also provide some protection for citizens seeking legal remedy 
against abuses by administrative authorities, particularly in an era when any 
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instrument of the judicial contest of administrative decisions was virtually 
completely revoked. 
 Following 1945, the system of the prosecution in Eastern–European countries 
was transformed according to the Soviet model. As pursuant to the Constitution 
of 1949, a centralised, hierarchical and independent prosecution system was 
established in Hungary after 1953, as well, which was subordinated exclusively 
to the supreme organ of representation. Besides, the scope of duties of the 
prosecution included the tasks connected with criminal procedures (the 
supervision of legality of investigations, accusation and prosecution in court 
proceedings, the supervision of legality of the implementation of penal measures), 
as well as partly tasks connected with civil procedures, furthermore, the 
prosecution’s office was specifically responsible for the general supervision of 
the observance of the law. No substantial change was effected later in the legal 
status of prosecution, although, owing to partial amendments in the meantime, 
the scope of the general supervision of legality was restricted. After 1972, 
the responsibilities of the prosecution ceased to include the supervision of 
the legality of economic activities, and after 1990, owing to the introduction 
of new methods of supervision, the supervision of local self-governments 
(councils). However, as pursuant to the currently effective Act V of 1972 
(and its Amendments) on Prosecution, the supervision of legality exercised 
by the prosecution shall pertain even today to legal rules, other norms, general 
regulations and individual decisions applying the law of organs of state 
administration under the level of Government. Furthermore, it pertains to 
decisions of non-judicial organs settling legal disputes, to decisions of business 
and other organisations concerning relations of employment and those of 
membership in co-operatives, as well as their measures with general effect 
issued when enabled by law. In this scope, omission also shall be subject to 
supervisory procedures ex officio or upon notification. In case of infringement 
of law, redress by the public prosecutor is not admissible (except in cases of 
petty offences), however, he may initiate that the competent organisation 
terminated or prevented the infringement of the law. In case of the availability 
of legal conditions, e.g., the prosecutor may lodge a protest with the organi-
sation that infringed the law or with its superior organ (organ that performs 
legality supervision on behalf of the state). Furthermore, the prosecutor may 
lodge a complaint with the director of the organisation so that the illegal practice 
or the infringement of the law in the form of omission was terminated, or in 
case the risk of future infringement of the law obtains, he may lodge an 
admonition in the interest of its prevention, etc. 
 With respect to its organisational structure and functions, the prosecution 
has not changed fundamentally since the “socialist” transformation, in spite 
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of the fact that its possibility and claim has been asserted and recurrently 
highlighted since the years of 1988–1989. Based on research, this, as an 
alternative, was formulated under the document titled “Conception of the 
Regulation of the New Constitution of the Hungarian People’s Republic” of 
30th November, 1988 and under the Resolution of Parliament adopted on 9th 
March, 1989 on the Principles of the Regulation of the Constitution of Hungary. 
However, the conceptions concerning transformation were not recognised 
either by the Draft Act of 29th May, 1989 amending the Constitution or by 
the agreement concluded at the National Round–Table Negotiations,6 and, as 
a consequence, were not adopted under the comprehensive Amendment of 
the Constitution of 1989, either. However, with reference to conceptual–
professional considerations, the demand for such a transformation recurrently 
manifested itself in the endeavours of successive Governments after the free 
elections in 1990. According to the more or less prevalent models adopted 
in Western Europe, the motive of these endeavours was to integrate the 
prosecution into the organisational structure of the executive power and to 
subordinate it to the supervision and authority of the Minister of Justice in 
Hungary, as well. This could promote that the Government contributes to 
framing policy concerning penal law not only by the submission of bills, but 
by drawing on the powers of the prosecution. This is possible all the more 
because the extension and the establishment of other “external” safeguards for 
the legality of administration (quasi general introduction of administrative 
jurisdiction, introduction of the institution of the ombudsman) supersede 
the so-called general legality supervision by the prosecution that would sub-
stantiate the sustenance of the prosecution as independent of the executive 
power. The realisation of these endeavours, which requires an Amendment of 
the Constitution, has, however, so far been met by the resistance of the successive 
oppositions that feared the excessive strengthening of the Government, although, 
forceful conceptual and professional reservations have also had bearing on 
such a turn of events. It has been raised, e.g., that in case of the adoption of 
that solution, the penal proceedings preceding the judicial phase, except for 
some measures, would not be subject to “independent”, external control, it would 
be completely subordinated to the executive power which, without the introduc-
tion of adequate “counterbalances”, would threaten the assurance of the 
legality of criminal procedures. Therefore, following the model adopted in 
other countries, the institution of the investigating judge and in a relatively 
  
 6 Bozóki, A.–Elbert, M. et al. (eds.): A rendszerváltás forgatókönyve. Kerekasztal-
tárgyalások 1989-ben (The Dramaturgy of the Political Transformation. Round–Table 
Negotiations in 1989). Vol. 6. op. cit., 100. and following. 
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wide scope that of subsidiary private accusation should be introduced. Further-
more, the consideration has been raised that the extension or establishment 
of various safeguards of legality promoting the “external” supervision of 
administration may not fully substitute the “general” supervision of legality 
exercised by the prosecution that substantiates the independent system of 
prosecution. It cannot be replaced by the extension of administrative jurisdiction, 
since it is inadmissible in cases specified by law, and, we cannot disregard the 
option that an organ independent of the administration may initiate legality 
proceedings ex officio, since no party will take action if the decision infringes 
the law in his favour. The supervision exercised by the prosecution cannot be 
fully replaced by the powers of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Civic 
Rights, either, since the Commissioner may intervene exclusively by reason of 
the injury of constitutional rights, not by reason of the unlawful operation of 
state administration in general. Therefore, if the prosecution was subordinated 
to the Minister of Justice by terminating its power of the general supervision of 
legality, similarly to the solutions adopted in other countries, the Parliamentary 
Commissioner for Civic Rights should be authorised to perform the legality 
supervision of the “entire” state administration, in the scope of which he could 
safeguard the enforcement of constitutional rights, too. 
 
 
The Reorganisation of Jurisdiction 
 
Based on previous research, the conception issued by the Ministry of Justice 
on 30th November, 1988 related to drafting the new Constitution of the Hungarian 
People’s Republic, already referred to all aspects that had great significance 
with respect to the development of jurisdiction in the course of political trans-
formation. The core issues of reform endeavours thenceforth and following 
the adoption of the Resolution of Parliament of 9th March, 1989 on the Principles 
of the Regulation of the Constitution of Hungary were the following: more 
consistent assurance of the constitutional principle of the judicial administration 
of justice, reinforcement of the unity of judicial organisation, enforcement 
of democratic jurisdiction with respect to realities, furthermore, universal 
establishment of guarantees for judicial independence. These endeavours were 
barely asserted under the Draft Act of 29th May, 1989 amending the 
Constitution, however, quite obviously, they were highlighted again at the 
National Round–Table Negotiations in relation to the constitutional regulation 
of the state establishment, so far as the restriction of the powers of special 
courts and the extension of guarantees for judicial independence was concerned. 
However, the actual reform commenced only subsequently to the comprehensive 
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Amendment of the Constitution of 1989 and was accomplished later, via the 
adoption of further amendments and Acts implementing the Constitution. 
 The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789 in France 
proclaimed that any society in which guarantees for rights and the separation 
of powers are not secured does not have a Constitution. The first European 
Constitutional Charter of 1791 (of France) that adopted the Declaration as its 
integral part set forth that judicial power pertains to the judges. Whereas, the 
requirement of the separation of powers in further French and Western European 
constitutional development evolved into the requirement of the division and 
counterbalance of powers, this hardly affected the constitutional requirement 
that jurisdiction should be exercised by courts. Furthermore, the principle was 
also set forth under the constitutions of European socialist countries, although, 
together with the conception of the unity of state power. They could not 
disregard the general requirement that jurisdiction must pertain to the power of 
the courts, since it is exclusively the particular organisation and procedures of 
courts circumscribed by guarantees, which ensures that the administration of 
justice shall be exercised in a lawful and impartial manner. Both the original text 
of the Constitution of 1949 and the effective Constitution of Hungary set forth 
the principle of the judicial administration of justice, too. 
 We cannot fail to mention that the monopoly of courts to administer justice 
has never and nowhere prevailed with full consequence. For practical purposes, 
(e.g., expeditiousness, economising, knowledge of facts and locality, relieving 
courts) other organs have also attended to administering justice. Such a situation 
developed in Hungary, too. Nevertheless, so that the constitutional principle of 
the judicial administration of justice could be more consistently enforced, 
Economic Adjudicatory Commissions were dissolved in 1972 (their competence 
was taken over by ordinary courts) and, in the course of political trans-
formation, the competence of non-judicial organs administering justice was 
more overtly restricted. The so-called social administration of justice (social 
court’s adjudication) was declared unconstitutional in 1991, then, the work of 
Labour and Co-operative Adjudicatory Commissions was also terminated in 
1992. However, even recently similar quasi judicial organs have also been 
operating, such as the Public Procurement Adjudicatory Commission to adjudge 
unlawful or disputed cases pertaining to public procurement. Administrative 
organs shall proceed in certain scopes of actions, primarily in procedures 
initiated by reason of petty offences. Arbitration shall be admitted in economic 
legal disputes and other scopes of cases recognised by law, etc. Thus despite 
the restriction of the competence of jurisdiction of non–judicial organs, e.g. 
in Hungary, we still can’t posit as a fact in practice the exclusive judicial 
monopoly of jurisdiction. Although, we admit exceptions that are unproble-
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matic with regard to their narrow scope and guarantees, we can assert that the 
Constitution does not contain even today either reference to their admission or 
stipulate limitations on the authorisation of non-judicial organs to administer 
justice, furthermore, it does not specify a main rule concerning the admissibility 
of the judicial review of the decisions of these organs. 
 The requirement of equality before the law implies the enforcement of 
equality before jurisdiction. This postulates that the cases of subjects of law, 
i.e., legal entities and natural persons shall be adjudicated by the same organs, 
and that provisions of law shall be rendered uniform interpretation by the 
organs of jurisdiction. In the judicial organisation that is safeguarded by the 
establishment of a unified system of courts. Consequently, in different consti-
tutional systems all cases pertaining to courts shall be adjudicated, in principle, 
by courts of the same type and organisation, and all courts shall be linked on 
the grounds of powers of appeal–review and through the guarantees of the 
uniform interpretation and application of law. 
 Following the bourgeois transformation, the functioning of extraordinary 
courts, and special courts which establish privileges or manifest discrimination 
and are organised on the basis of social, national–ethnic or religious distinctions, 
have always been inadmissible on consolidated constitutional grounds. In 
Hungary, such courts had not obtained in the period preceding the political 
transformation, either, whereas, similarly to other countries, specialised 
courts, such as Labour Courts and Military Tribunals had operated in a narrow 
scope in specific proceedings. However, in favour of the reinforcement of 
the unity of judicial organisation, the conception issued by the Ministry of 
Justice on 30th November, 1988 related to drafting the Constitution took the 
sustenance of Military Tribunals into consideration, then the Resolution of 
Parliament adopted on 9th March, 1989 on the Principles of the Regulation of 
the Constitution promised both the dissolution of Labour Courts and narrowing 
the scope of competence of Military Tribunals. At the National Round–Table 
Negotiations, the Opposition Round–Table maintained that Military Tribunals 
could function exclusively for the state of defence. In the transition period, the 
urgent dissolution of Military Tribunals and Prosecution is inevitable with 
respect to guarantees.7 Finally, in the course of the political transformation, 
Labour Courts have been operative until recently, whereas for times of peace, 
Military Tribunals were dissolved as pursuant to Act LVI of 1991 amending 
Act IV of 1972 on the Courts, and since that time military justice has been 
administered by the military panels operating at the appointed County Courts 
or the Metropolitan Court in Budapest and at the High Court in Budapest. 
  
 7 Ibid. 99. and following.  
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 Despite the functioning of Labour Courts established in counties and 
Budapest, the organisation of courts may be deemed to be unified. Judicial 
competence is concentrated at ordinary courts with general scope of jurisdiction. 
Generally, the courts that may proceed to administer justice are the Local 
Courts, County Courts or the Metropolitan Court of Budapest, the High Courts–
three of which were established on 1st January, 2003, supplemented by two 
further ones on 1st July, 2004 as pursuant to Act LIX of 1997 amending the 
Constitution proposed under the Resolution of Parliament of 9th March, 1989 
on the Principles of the Regulation of the Constitution of Hungary–and the 
Supreme Court. The judicial system is headed by the Supreme Court that shall 
assure the uniformity of administration of justice by the courts.   
 Since the adoption of constitutional charters, safeguarding the democracy 
of jurisdiction has featured as a distinct constitutional endeavour, which, in 
times of epochal revolutionary changes, necessitated the election of judges for 
definite terms, moreover, the involvement of lay assessors into jurisdiction. 
Whereas, in periods of political consolidation, the reasonableness of the 
observance of such democratic principles for themselves would usually be 
challenged and the meticulous enforcement and application of democratically 
adopted law deemed to be the major standard of democratic jurisdiction. 
Therefore, the system of the filling up the posts of judges must comply with 
the requirement of judicial independence and competence. The involvement of 
lay–assessors was also challenged on the grounds of its being in different cases 
a mere formality from the outset. 
 In several countries, based on the considerations above, the appointment of 
judges for an indefinite period has been instituted as opposed to the election of 
judges for a definite period, even if the election of judges is known even 
nowadays in a certain scope, e.g., in some member states of the U.S. and also 
in Switzerland. In Hungary, the system of the election of judges as pursuant to 
the original text of the Constitution of 1949, the exercise of which by the organs 
of representation was prescribed under its implementing rules, was never 
enforced, since the offices of judges used to be filled by way of appointment in 
a broad scope for a long time. As a matter of fact, the institution of the election 
of judges was stipulated under the Amendment of the Constitution of 1972, so 
that the judges were elected by the Presidential Council of the People’s 
Republic, composed of 21 MPs, for an indefinite period. In the course of the 
political transformation, the comprehensive Amendment of the Constitution of 
1989 dissolved the Presidential Council functioning as a collective Head of 
State and its role was taken over by the one-man Head of State. Thence, the 
system of the appointment of judges for an indefinite period after a three years’ 
probationary period has positively prevailed. The President of the Republic is 
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authorised to appoint the judges. Unarguably, their appointment for an indefinite 
period creates better conditions for the enforcement of judicial independence. 
It is also beyond doubt that in case sufficient guarantees are provided, the 
appointment system as opposed to the contingency of election facilitates the 
selection of judges with adequate training. The way of selection to various 
major offices of the judiciary sometimes may be different, e.g., according to 
a more recent provision, the President of the Supreme Court is elected by 
Parliament for a period of 6 years.  
 So far as people’s participation is concerned, the formerly general partici-
pation of people’s–assessors in adjudication on the first instance was confined 
to a narrower scope in Hungary as well as other countries after the 1960s. 
According to experience, the involvement of lay–judges incurred substantial 
expenses, whereas it barely promoted more meticulous adjudication. On account 
of their low performance, the involvement of lay–judges was mere formality, 
since the expectation that “practical experience” and the expertise of lay–judges 
could support adjudication, except for certain groups of cases, was rather 
chimerical. On the contrary, it was the selection of the unfit that prevailed 
in the system of the selection of lay–judges, i.e., not the most suitable persons 
were selected, but those, whose absence from the workplace caused the least 
disturbance. Even in such a case mustering the required number of lay–judges 
would be a recurrent problem by reason of disinclination to participate. These 
factors led to the solution that beyond labour adjudication the involvement of 
lay–judges was restricted to those (groups of) cases in which the participation 
of expert lay–judges could in fact promote reaching a more technical and 
considerate decision, furthermore, lay assessors could counteract the faults 
entailed by routine in the scope of judicial discretion, particularly in serious 
penal cases. Because according to sociological surveys, the attention of the 
professional judge in the panel is focused primarily on the act of the perpetrator, 
whereas that of lay–judges concentrates on the person of the perpetrator. 
These facts influenced the Conception issued by the Ministry of Justice 30th 
November, 1988 in the course of drafting the Constitution and the Resolution of 
Parliament on the Principles of the Regulation of the Constitution of Hungary, 
too, both of which proposed that the new Constitution confined the involvement 
of non-professional judges in jurisdiction exclusively to those cases specified 
by law. However, it was only later that the “reversal” of the constitutional rule 
pertaining to adjudication by lay–judges or “reducing” the institution in view of 
reality was provided for under Act LIX of 1997 amending the Constitution. As 
it is known, according to the former text of the Constitution, courts administered 
justice through panels consisting of professional judges and lay–assessors, even 
if Acts could provide for exceptions. According to the effective Constitution, 
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“Non-professional judges shall also participate in judicature in the cases and in 
the manner prescribed by law.” This provision theoretically also facilitated 
the institutionalisation of jury trials, which, however, devoid of a compelling 
legacy, would amount to hardly any sense in Hungary, primarily because jury 
trials undermine the constraints imposed by the law of evidence, furthermore, 
this solution, by way of making an artificial distinction between decisions on 
matters of fact and on legal questions would in fact transfer the responsibility to 
lay–judges of making autonomous decisions on questions, too, which in fact 
require significant legal expertise, such as the qualification of the act in penal 
cases. 
 Guaranteeing judicial independence is a fundamental constitutional principle 
of the judicial system. Following Anglo-Saxon antecedents, its legal bases 
were established by the first modern constitutional charters, which instituted 
guarantees primarily to prevent the removal of judges from office. Later, the 
general rule according to which “judges are independent and subjected only 
to the law” has been adopted by constitutions mainly according to the model of 
the (German) Constitution of Weimar of 1919. Following 1936, this rule for 
propagandistic reasons was introduced into European socialist constitutions, 
among others into the Hungarian Constitution of 1949, as well. Nevertheless, 
this principle as a rule was not enforced until the 1960s and 1970s by reason 
of frequent intervention into the work of the judiciary, in spite of the fact 
that several legal guarantees existed for safeguarding judicial independence. 
Subsequently, external political influence on judicial administration of justice 
slackened, nevertheless, it became obvious that the democratic transformation 
of social–political conditions and the extension of legal guarantees for judicial 
independence were necessary for the elimination of legal–political encumbrances 
of enforcement of judicial independence. In fact, the democratic changes taking 
place in 1989–1990 and the transformation of the system of structural and 
personal legal guarantees of judicial independence established universal grounds, 
which facilitated that the judge endowed with human and professional dignity 
accomplished his/her duty in an independent, impartial and unprejudiced manner. 
 In democratic political systems, in which the exertion of influence upon 
the work of the judiciary is deemed inadmissible, the enforcement of judicial 
independence is safeguarded by a comprehensive system of structural and 
personal legal guarantees. Structural legal guarantees have been instituted so 
that accessibility of adjudicating judges can be precluded via the establishment 
of the relationship of courts with organs that supervise adjudication, guarantee 
the unity of law, administer courts or perform other duties. Legal guarantees 
related to the person of the judge facilitates that the judge, so far as his/her 
personal existence (career) as a judge is concerned, does not have to fear adverse 
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consequences, if he fails to recognise unlawful intervening attempts, that he/she 
shall not be exposed to unwelcome harassment, and that he/she can avert 
situations of incompatibility that may affect his/her work. With respect to these 
factors, following the political transformation in Hungary, several far-reaching 
changes have taken place. In the followings, we shall outline those we deem to 
be most important: 
 – The issue whether MPs in Parliament could address questions to the 
President of the Supreme Court concerning all matters pertaining to his scope 
of competence was already a subject of dispute at the National Round–Table 
Negotiations.8 With respect to judicial independence, this option was eliminated 
as pursuant to the comprehensive Amendment of the Constitution in 1989. 
 – In view of the text of the Draft Amendment of the Constitution of 29th 
May, 1989, the standpoint according to which the President of the Supreme 
Court shall not be accountable to report on the work of the Supreme Court to 
Parliament was formulated at the National Round–Table Negotiations. That 
took effect as pursuant to the comprehensive Amendment of the Constitution 
in 1989. 
 – The document issued by the Ministry of Justice on 30th November, 1988 
on the Conception of the Regulation of the New Constitution of the Hungarian 
People’s Republic was the first one to propose in an official form that the 
system of the judicial administration, by way of the reinforcement of the 
competence of autonomous judicial bodies or setting up new ones, should be 
reconstituted so that its functioning (guaranteeing the material and personnel 
conditions of the administration of justice) could not be an instrument of inter-
vention into issues of content in the administration of justice. The significance 
of judicial self-government and, for instance, the necessity of the establish-
ment of the National Judiciary Council was emphasised also under the Resolution 
of Parliament of 9th March, 1989 on the Principles of the Regulation of the 
Constitution of Hungary. The comprehensive Amendment of the Constitution 
of 1989 disregarded that issue, however, the systematic establishment of the 
self-government of courts commenced as pursuant to the Amendments of 
Act IV of 1972 on the Courts in the course of the legislation of the 1990s. 
The competence of the Minister of Justice to supervise the general functioning 
of courts was terminated under Act XLII of 1989, whereas Act LXVII of 1991 
legalised the operation not only of the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court, 
Divisions of the Supreme Court and county-metropolitan courts, but of new 
bodies of judicial self-governments (county–metropolitan judiciary conferences, 
county–metropolitan councils of judges elected by the judges out of the judges 
  
 8 Ibid. 87. and following. 
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and the National Judiciary Council), too, which had a major role in formulating 
the decisions concerning the administration of courts. However, it was Act LIX 
of 1997 amending the Constitution that entailed a complete “breakthrough” 
concerning the administration of courts, according to which the central 
administration of courts shall be exercised by the National Council of Justice 
as the successor of the National Judiciary Council. As pursuant to Act LXVI 
of 1997 on the Organisation and Administration of Courts that replaced Act of 
IV of 1972, it’s chaired by the President of the Supreme Court and its members 
are: 9 judges (elected for a term of six years by the delegate conference of the 
judges), the Minister of Justice, the Attorney General (Prosecutor General), the 
Chairman of the Hungarian Bar Association, and two MPs appointed by the 
Budgetary and Financial as well as Constitutional and Justice Committees in 
Parliament. Its decisions are reached by majority vote. Simultaneously, the 
authorisation of the Ministry of Justice to administer courts was terminated in 
an unequalled manner among European states, which led to the full autonomy 
of courts in the scope of administration. This solution obviously promoted the 
prevention of potential exertion of external pressure on judicial administration 
of justice, even if it could accommodate several irregularities, since this way, 
among others, the scope of responsibility of the Government did not pertain 
to the keeping in operation of courts, the management of problems related to 
finances, infrastructure and staffing any longer. With regard to the fact also 
that according to the Amendment as pursuant to Act XLVI of 2002, the 
Government shall table to the Parliament the proposal for the annual budget 
of the courts framed by the National Council of Justice without modifications.   
 – In the course of constitutional changes, the reinforcement of personal 
guarantees for judicial independence was of necessity also highlighted. The 
Conception of the Ministry of Justice issued on 30th November, 1988 
emphasised, e.g., that the Constitution had to stipulate that the judges could be 
exempted, suspended, transferred from office or discharged with pension 
against their will exclusively upon the proposal of the competent judicial self-
government body, on the grounds stipulated by the respective law. That was 
the starting point for the Resolution of Parliament adopted on 9th March, 1989 
on the Principles of the Regulation of the Constitution of Hungary, too. 
Eventually, that was substantiated by the respective provision of the Constitution 
reformulated under the comprehensive Amendment of the Constitution of 
1989 that stipulated “Judges may only be removed from office on the grounds 
and in accordance with the procedures specified by law.” Then, at the beginning 
of the 1990s, the Amendments of Act of 1972 on the Courts introduced a more 
and more meticulous reformulation of the grounds and the procedure in view 
of judicial independence, however, it developed into a system of guarantees 
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“devoid of defects” as pursuant to Act LXVI of 1997 on the Organisation and 
Administration of Courts and to Act LXVII of 1997 on the Legal Status and 
Remuneration of Judges and their further amendments. The latter enumerated 
the possible grounds for the exemption of judges, among others such as those on 
account of which the judges may be exempted from office even against their 
will. These reasons may be recognised without reservations, are generally 
circumscribed objectively and determined without the possibility of discretion 
(e.g. grounds for exemption may be that the judge has reached the retirement 
age of 70). In such cases, a proposal for the exemption of a judge shall be tabled 
by the National Council of Justice to the President of the Republic for taking 
decision after it has received the opinion of competent bodies of judicial self-
government. However, it is remarkable that in case the reason for exemption is 
circumscribed by law with “vague” legal concepts that substantiate discretion, 
the proposal for exemption may be drafted on condition that prior guarantees 
have been exhausted. Namely, if the judge has become permanently incompetent 
for the fulfilment of his office, the President of the County (Metropolitan) Court, 
of the High Court or of the Supreme Court shall demand in writing that the 
judge resigned from his office. In case the judge fails to comply, in a medical 
case his state of health shall be examined, in case a professional ground 
obtains, an anticipatory evaluation of his work shall be ordained. In a case of 
the establishment of professional incompetence judicial review is admissible. 
It is only afterwards that the National Council of Justice, considering the 
opinion of the competent body of judicial self-government, too, may submit 
the proposal for the exemption of the judge from office. 
 
 
The Establishment of the Constitutional Court 
 
The necessity of guaranteeing the protection of the Constitution has been on the 
agenda since the adoption of the first modern constitutional charters. What has 
been assigned special significance was to ensure the prevention or elimination of 
the breach of the Constitution with respect to law-making, since the application 
of unconstitutional legal rules may lead to massive breaches of the Constitution.  
 In the course of development, in several countries various organisations or 
mechanisms were institutionalised to ensure the exercise of a prior and a posterior 
norm control, so that the constitutionality of law could be guaranteed. Among 
the solutions adopted with respect to a posterior norm control, the most 
efficient were those, which, for instance, endeavoured to promote the review 
of unconstitutional legal rules, not via the framework of law-making, but via 
impartial, independent organs, the courts. 
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 It is remarkable that in modern legal systems, the system of judicial concrete 
norm control has been established since the Marbury v. Madison Decision of the 
U.S. Federal Supreme Court in 1803, according to which all courts have the 
power to examine the constitutionality of the relevant statute in a particular case 
and if it is found unconstitutional, it shall not be applied in that case. Such cases 
then usually reach supreme courts via appeals, thus the final judgement 
concerning the applicability of the law is made either by the Supreme Court of 
the member state, or in cases pertaining to the federal Constitution, by the 
Federal Supreme Court. This court shall not make a decision on the annulment 
or repeal of any law with a general effect, however, a peculiarity of the 
American legal system is that any legal rule that is found unconstitutional with 
respect to a case shall become dead letter. Unless the Constitution is amended or 
the court modifies its standpoint, it may not be applied by courts any longer. 
In U.S. law, the principle of “stare decisis” is generally recognised, which 
means that it is mandatory for lower courts to adopt the precedent established 
by a higher court. Throughout the development of law on the European continent, 
e.g., in Hungary during the period between 1869 and 1949, there were 
opportunities for reviewing the constitutionality or lawfulness mainly of decrees 
in the process of application of the law by courts, as well. However, devoid of 
the direct binding force of precedents, the system of judicial concrete norm 
control manifest in setting aside the application of unconstitutional legal rules 
proved to be hardly applicable without the injury of the uniform application of 
the law and legal security. For the consequential assurance of the constitutionality 
and lawfulness of legal rules, such a solution was needed that facilitated that 
organs independent of any other organs, i.e. courts could make decisions on 
the annulment or repeal of unconstitutional legal rules abstractly with general 
binding force. 
 Disregarding the fact that in some countries ordinary courts (e.g. in a certain 
scope in Switzerland) or administrative courts (e.g., in France with respect to 
decrees) have been authorised to exercise abstract norm control, in the Post-
2nd World War decades, more and more countries followed the model of the 
Constitution of Austria of 1920, so far as independent constitutional courts 
have been authorised to perform that duty, because the judicial review of 
legislation was considered a function of law-making, rather than of juris-
diction. Ordinary and administrative judges have competence for jurisdiction 
and “implementation” of law. In continental Europe assigning judges the task 
of lawmaking (at least “negative” lawmaking), which is an indisputably political 
task, would have contradicted their professional training, way of thinking and all 
prevalent traditions. Featuring the courts that administer justice as politically 
involved bodies would not have been a propitious choice with respect to public 
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opinion. The requirement of the division of state powers could also have 
affected the establishment of independent constitutional courts in the sense that 
constitutional judicature should not result in the concentration of powers at 
courts administering justice. Besides, in several countries the expectation to set 
up a new, higher and distinguished body also substantiated the establishment 
of a separate constitutional court, which in the field of the control of the 
government may be authorised not only to review the constitutionality of legal 
rules, but also to perform other tasks, such as holding high-ranking state officials 
responsible (so-called “state judicature”), and pronouncing judgement in case of 
conflicts between supreme state bodies, state units in federal states, etc.  
 The Hungarian constitutional system established in 1949, similarly to other 
socialist countries, did not institute the possibility of judicial review of Acts 
and other legal rules. It was particularly the competence of judicial organs to 
decide on the constitutionality of Acts that was deemed inadmissible. This 
conception was theoretically based on the principle of authorisation the 
supreme body of state-power and representation of the people for the exercise 
of all powers, i.e., if an extra-parliamentary body had the competence to decide 
on the constitutionality of various Acts of Parliament, this body would 
overreach the competence of the Parliament and violate the principle of the 
sovereignty of Parliament. However, there were practical reservations also 
concerning constitutional jurisdiction, first and foremost, that its establish-
ment could become “an impeder of revolutionary legislation”. As a consequence, 
the legislative organs within the scope of their law-making power could decide 
on the annulment or amendment of law deemed to be unconstitutional or 
unlawful. Neither did the comprehensively amended Constitution of 1972 
change that situation, which, for instance, specifically stipulated that Parliament 
and the Presidential Council are responsible for guaranteeing the observance of 
the Constitution. Nevertheless, the law-making bodies (or their supervisory 
bodies) did not exercise de facto norm control, apart from some exceptions 
concerning local council law–making, although, its urgency became more and 
more apparent, firstly, in view of the volume of the effective and constantly 
amended legal materials of 10–20 thousand pages requireing to correct at least 
inevitable faults of regulation techniques and secondly, of meeting demands 
concerning constitutionality certainly asserted after 1980. This conveyed the 
idea that for the professional promotion of the work of law–making bodies 
competent to exercise norm control, a so-called Council of Constitutional 
Law attached to the Parliament should be established that was not competent 
to terminate unconstitutionality, however, it could initiate that law-making 
bodies with competence reviewed a legal rule or a normative legal directive in 
case their unconstitutionality was established. In its own scope of competence, 
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it could only stay the implementation of unconstitutional provisions of a 
legal rule or of the directive with the exception of Acts, law–decrees and general 
norms of interpretation binding courts set forth by the Supreme Court. This body 
set up as pursuant to Act II of 1983 amending the Constitution and to its 
implementing Act I of 1984 consisted of 11–17 members, who were mostly 
MPs and other public figures [generally experts of (constitutional) law] and 
were elected by Parliament for one parliamentary term. In case of the 
establishment of unconstitutionality, it could proceed on its own initiative or 
on that of authorised state bodies, state officials, among them MPs, supreme 
national organs of social organizations, national organs representing interests 
of state economic organizations and organs of co-operatives. The direct 
initiation of the procedures by those, who had positive claims or were positively 
interested in the review of the constitutionality of legal rules, was not allowed. 
However, besides these limitations on competence and procedure, what 
accounted for the fact that the Council of Constitutional Law could barely 
perform its mission, was primarily the mistrust of the leading political and 
state organs, which were “offended” by reason of the control exercised over 
their law-making activity, which restrained the actual operation of the Council 
of Constitutional Law. Throughout its five–year operation with eleven board 
sessions, the Council put issues of constitutionality on its agenda ten times and 
unconstitutionality was established on merely five occasions.9 Thus, by the 
second half of the 1980s, it became manifest that the amplified review system 
of the constitutionality and lawfulness of legal rules still based on the decision-
making power of legislative bodies was barely working and the system of norm 
control was quite inoperative without providing guarantees for independent 
proceedings. Which explains why in the midst of highly variable political 
circumstances the Constitution as amended by Act I of 1989 referred to the 
establishment of a Constitutional Court authorised to annul unconstitutional 
legal rules and normative legal directives with the exception of Acts. 
 In the course of drafting the new Constitution, the document issued by the 
Ministry of Justice on 30th November, 1988, the Resolution of Parliament 
adopted on 9th March, 1989 as well as the Draft Act of 29th May, 1989 
amending the Constitution all took into account that a Constitutional Court 
will be part of the new constitutional system. In case unconstitutionality is 
established by the Constitutional Court, it shall have the power to suspend the 
enforcement of Acts until an opposing qualified majority decision is reached by 
Parliament, furthermore, to annul legal rules of lower rank. The question, 
however, whether citizens should be allowed to initiate proceedings by the 
  
 9 See, Holló: op. cit., 15. and following. 
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Constitutional Court, and if so, in which cases, has been left open. Reasonably, 
these were the issues concerning the Constitutional Court in the new 
constitutional system, on which the various standpoints most powerfully clashed 
at the National Round–Table Negotiations following the withdrawal of the Draft 
Acts amending the Constitution and on the Constitutional Court in June. The 
Opposition Round–Table consistently maintained that the Constitutional Court 
should have the power to annul unconstitutional Acts also and that any citizen 
could initiate proceedings for the review of legal norms with the potential 
introduction of filtering mechanisms.10 Basically, this conception was affirmed 
subsequently both under the comprehensive Amendment of the Constitution of 
1989 and under Act XXXII of 1989 on the Constitutional Court implementing 
the Constitution. As pursuant to these Acts, the Constitutional Court could start 
its work on 1st January, 1990.  
 The Constitutional Court, as pursuant to Act LXXIV of 1994 amending 
the Constitution, consists of 11 Judges. The Judges of the Constitutional 
Court, who may be once re-elected, shall be elected for a term of 9 years by 
Parliament with a qualified majority vote of the MPs. The members of the 
Constitutional Court are independent and their decisions shall be made 
exclusively in compliance with the Constitution and other law. In cases 
specified by law, they proceed at plenary sessions or in three-member boards. 
 The Constitutional Court exercises a prior and a posterior norm control 
and also proceeds in public law disputes as pursuant to the Constitution or 
other law. For instance: 
 – The Constitutional Court shall implement review of Acts adopted by 
Parliament prior to promulgation upon the motion of the President of the 
Republic; the Procedural Rules of Parliament upon the motion of Parliament; the 
unconstitutionality of international agreements before their conclusion upon the 
motion of Parliament, the President of the Republic or the Government. (Until 
the Amendment of 1998, it also had the power to review the constitutionality of 
bills on the motion of Parliament, of its standing committee, or of fifty MPs.)  
 – The classical powers of the Constitutional Court include a posterior review 
of the unconstitutionality of legal rules and norms for state direction other than 
legal rules. Uniquely among European countries, the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court shall be authorised to do so on the petition of anybody without being 
personally concerned. The circumscription of this form of petition, which 
anybody is entitled to resort to, by the introduction of “filtering mechanisms” 
  
 10 Bozóki, A.–Elbert, M. et al. (eds.): A rendszerváltás forgatókönyve. Kerekasztal-
tárgyalások 1989-ben (The Dramaturgy of the Political Transformation. Round–Table 
Negotiations in 1989). Vol. 6. op. cit., 169. and following. 
174 ATTILA RÁCZ 
  
has been recurrently proposed, however, it is obvious that the petitions of 
citizens seeking redress by reason of injury via unconstitutional legal norms 
may not be precluded by the introduction of such mechanisms. As a matter of 
law, as a result of a posterior norm control, the Constitutional Court could fully 
or partly annul the unconstitutional norm (Acts included). Norm shall generally 
lose its validity on the day of publication of the decision on its annulment, 
however, the Constitutional Court may stipulate its annulment or inapplicability 
in a specific case on a different date, so far as that is substantiated by the interest 
of security of law or of the particularly important interest of the party who 
initiates the proceedings. The Constitutional Court shall always provide for 
the review of criminal procedures concluded with a final decision based on 
the application of an unconstitutional norm, in case the convict has not been 
exempted from adverse consequences, and if from the annulment of the provision 
applied in the proceedings resulted either in the reduction or dispensing with the 
penalty or the measure, or in immunity from or limitation of liability. 
 – The Constitutional Court shall examine ex officio or on the motion of state 
organs specified by law, officials in high public offices or any MP, whether any 
legal rule or norm for state direction other than a legal rule contradicts an 
international agreement promulgated by a Hungarian legal rule. 
 – The Constitutional Court shall consider constitutional complaints, which 
those concerned are entitled to file in by reason of the injury of their consti-
tutionally guaranteed rights on condition that the injury of their rights was 
incurred by the application of an unconstitutional legal rule and that they have 
already exploited all available instruments of legal remedy or they are not 
granted other instruments of redress. In such cases, the Constitutional Court shall 
annul the applied unconstitutional legal rule or its provision. If it simultaneously 
establishes the inapplicability of the legal rule in a particular case, there is an 
opportunity for remedy in the particular case that substantiates constitutional 
complaint so that the competent judicial or administrative organ which proceeds 
may not apply the unconstitutional norm when considering the case of 
available extraordinary remedy.  
 – If the Constitutional Court ex officio or on any motion establishes that 
the law–making body has failed to fulfil its duty of law-making deriving 
from legislative authorisation and that has incurred unconstitutionality on 
the grounds of omission, it shall summon the body to perform its duty by 
determining the deadline. 
 – The Constitutional Court as a “court of competence” – apart from courts – 
shall make decisions concerning conflicts of competence arising between state 
organs, between local self-governments and state organs, furthermore, between 
local self-governments.  
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 – The Constitutional Court, on the motion of state organs and officials in 
high public offices prescribed by law, shall officially interpret the provisions 
of the Constitution abstractly.  
 – The Constitutional Court may proceed in further scopes of power specified 
under the Constitution and other Acts, for instance, if certain conditions 
stipulated under the Constitution obtain, it shall make a decision concerning 
the impeachment of the President of the Republic.  
 In a summary, we may assume that during the political transformation the 
trustworthy legal prerequisites of protection of the Constitution and of review 
of unconstitutional law have been formulated in Hungary via the establishment 
of the Constitutional Court and the meticulous definition of its structure and 
competence. Moreover, the new democratic political system did not impose 
again actual restrictions on the fulfilment of duties of the Constitutional Court 
set forth under the Constitution and other law, despite the professional–political 
disputes concerning its work. That is also manifested by the fact that in 
recent years, according to the figures of 2002, the Constitutional Court, in 
compliance with its main duty, annulled several legal norms, among them 139 
Statutes and statutory provisions deemed as unconstitutional.11 These 
account for the fact that the development of constitutional law has reached a 
new phase, in Hungary, too, where the provisions of the Constitution have 
been transformed from “constitutional common decencies” into real, legally 
sanctioned rules of conduct. 
 
 
 
 
  
 11 Az Alkotmánybíróság által alkotmánysértőnek minősített törvények, illetve 
törvényi rendelkezések (Statutes and Statutory Provisions Declared as Unconstitutional 
by the Constitutional Court). Xeroxed Manuscript, Legal Department of the Office of 
Parliament, 4th July, 2002. 20. 
